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Hegel and the Failure of Civil Society 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
Abstract 
On what might be called a Marxist reading, Hegel’s analysis of civil society 
accurately recognizes a necessary tendency toward a polarization of classes 
and the pauperization of the proletariat, a problem for which Hegel, however, 
has no solution.  Indeed, Marxists think there can be no solution short of 
eliminating civil society.  It is not at all clear that this standard reading is 
correct.  The present paper tries to show how it is plausible to understand 
Hegel as proposing a solution, one that is similar to that of social democrats, 
and one that could actually work.  
 
I.  The Marxist Reading 
Duncan Forbes argues that, “Marxist and marxist-influenced studies of Hegel’s 
idea of the state have seen it as helpless in the face of the problem of poverty … and 
as an essentially self-contradictory reflection of a bourgeois state on its way out.”1  
We find this Marxist interpretation set out at greater length by Avineri: 
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Hegel realized that the mechanism of the market creates social polarization, 
poverty and alienation; in the Philosophy of Right the same radical critique of 
civil society emerges from Hegel’s discussion of the consequences of allowing it 
free reign.… Hegel suggests state intervention in order to mitigate some of the 
harsher aspects of poverty; yet ultimately he is unable to provide a radical 
solution.… Hegel accepts Smith’s view that behind the senseless and conflicting 
clash of egoistic interests in civil society a higher purpose can be discerned; but 
he does not agree with the hidden assumption which implies that everyone in 
society is thus being well taken care of.  Poverty, which for Smith is always 
marginal to his model, assumes another dimension in Hegel.  For the latter, 
pauperization and the subsequent alienation from society are not incidental to 
the system but endemic to it.  Moreover, Hegel goes to some length to show that 
every suggested remedial policy put forward to overcome poverty in modern 
society seems to be useless, and some of these policies may even boomerang.2 
 
I agree with Avineri’s characterization completely—except that I do not think it 
at all clear that Hegel fails, or that Hegel thinks he has failed, in solving this basic 
problem of civil society.  We should notice here, as Wood and Hardimon point out, 
that Eduard Gans, one of Hegel’s students, “thought that because the existence of an 
impoverished class ‘is only a fact, not something right, it must be possible to get to 
the basis of this fact and abolish it.’”3  Despite the optimism of Gans, the prevalent 
view is the Marxist one, that Hegel does not and cannot solve the basic problem of 
civil society.4  Hegel sees that civil society has a necessary tendency toward a 
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polarization of classes and the pauperization of the proletariat.  That is a significant 
insight on his part.  But he has no solution to this problem whatsoever.  Indeed, for 
Marxists there can be no solution.  One must just abandon civil society and eliminate 
the market.  While I consider myself a Marxist, it is not at all clear to me that this 
Marxist reading is correct.  I think it possible to read Hegel as proposing a solution.  
Furthermore, I think it possible that Hegel’s proposed solution could actually work.  
In other words, it could be the case that this Marxist reading is wrong about the 
facts—it could be that civil society can be prevented from producing polarization 
and pauperization—as social democrats and market socialists think.  
 
II.  The Failure of Civil Society? 
Hegel tells us that “civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as 
well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both.”5  He tells us: 
 
When the activity of civil society is unrestricted … the accumulation of wealth 
increases.…  But on the other hand, the specialization … and limitation of 
particular work also increase, as do likewise the dependence and want of the 
class which is tied to such work.…  When a large mass of people sinks below the 
level of a certain standard of living … that feeling of right, integrity …, and honor 
which comes from supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost.  
This leads to the creation of a rabble.…  No one can assert a right against nature, 
but within the conditions of society hardship at once assumes the form of a 
wrong inflicted on this or that class.  The important question of how poverty can 
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be remedied is one which agitates and torments modern society especially.…  If 
the direct burden [of support] were to fall on the wealthier class, or if direct 
means where available in other public institutions (such as wealthy hospitals, 
foundations, or monasteries) to maintain the increasingly impoverished mass at 
its normal standard of living, the livelihood of the needy would be ensured 
without the mediation of work; this would be contrary to the principle of civil 
society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual 
members.  Alternatively, their livelihood might be mediated by work … which 
would increase the volume of production; but it is precisely in overproduction 
and the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are themselves 
productive that the evil … consists …, and this is merely exacerbated by the two 
expedients in question.  This shows that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society 
is not wealthy enough—i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient—to 
prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble.6 
 
We should notice, in the first place, that Hegel is saying that this polarization and 
pauperization occur when the activity of civil society is unrestricted.  That certainly 
leaves open the possibility that restriction could avoid the problem.  Moreover, 
Hegel certainly seems to be saying that charity in fact could solve the problem; it is 
just that it would be at odds with the principle of civil society, that of individual self-
sufficiency and the honor and dignity that depend upon it.  Even so, the implication 
of this passage seems to be that it is only, or primarily, private charity that is at odds 
with the principle of civil society.  Poor relief that involves universal regulations and 
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ordinances, Hegel says in a previous passage, are “to be regarded as all the more 
perfect the less (in comparison with what is arranged publicly) is left for an 
individual to do by himself as his private inclination directs.”7  In another text, Hegel 
makes this point even more sharply: 
 
On the general plane it is for the state to prevent universal need by taking 
appropriate measures … even in the case of individual need it is better for 
provision to be made by the state.… in this way individuals can act in benevolent 
fashion using the machinery provided by the state.  Subjective assistance must 
be reduced to the minimum because it can harm instead of helping.8 
 
Here, assistance by the state is clearly distinguished from private charity, and it 
is taken to avoid the problems of the latter.  It is certainly the case, we will see when 
we get there, that corporations avoid such problems: 
 
Within the corporation, the help which poverty receives loses its contingent and 
unjustly … humiliating character, and wealth, in fulfilling the duty it owes to its 
association, loses the ability to provoke arrogance in its possessor and envy in 
others … 9  
 
Hegel is not holding what might be called the conservative position on charity, 
that it is humiliating and thus should not be given.  For Hegel it must be given, but in 
a way that avoids humiliation.  Thus, when Hegel says in the long passage quoted 
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above that the “important question of how poverty can be remedied is one which 
agitates and torments modern society especially,” he may not be suggesting, as the 
Marxists would have it, that the problem of poverty simply cannot be solved.  
Rather, he may be suggesting that while it could be solved there is disagreement 
about how to do so—especially concerning the issue of charity. 
So also, in the same long quotation, when Hegel says, “despite an excess of 
wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough—i.e. its own distinct resources are not 
sufficient—to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble,” he again 
may not be saying that the problem of polarization and pauperization cannot be 
solved at all.  He may be saying that the problem cannot be solved in an unrestricted 
civil society using only the resources available to an unrestricted civil society.  
Which means that if we call in the resources (that is, the restrictions) of the police,10 
corporations, and the state, we would have a different matter altogether.    
With that possibility in mind, we should notice that at the beginning of the 
section of the Philosophy of Right entitled “The Police and the Corporation,” Hegel 
tells us that in civil society, 
 
the right which is actually present in particularity means not only that 
contingencies which interfere with this or that end should be cancelled 
[aufgehoben] and that the undisturbed security of persons and property should be 
guaranteed, but also that the livelihood and welfare of individuals should be 




After telling us here at the very beginning of this section that particular welfare 
should be guaranteed as a right, eight pages later, in the middle of the sub-section 
entitled, “The Police,” Hegel gives us the famous passage that was quoted at length 
above to the effect that “despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy 
enough,” that is, the passage the Marxists take to be indicating the failure of civil 
society.   But then, four pages after that, at the end of the very same sub-section on 
“The Police,” Hegel writes, 
 
What the police provides for in the first instance is the actualization and 
preservation of the universal which is contained within the particularity of civil 
society, [and it does so] as an external order and arrangement for the protection 
and security of the masses of particular ends and interests which have their 
subsistence … in this universal.…  [P]articularity itself makes this universal 
which is present in its immanent interests, the end and object … of its will and 
activity, with the result that the ethical returns to civil society as an immanent 
principle.… ”12 
 
This does not make it sound like Hegel thinks civil society has failed.  It certainly 
does not sound like he thinks it must fail.  It sounds, instead, like he thinks civil 
society needs the police to avoid failure.  And Hegel certainly seems to be suggesting 
that the police can help avoid failure—even help civil society reach the universal 
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and return to the ethical.  Hegel then moves on to discuss the corporation and its 
contribution to the avoidance of civil society’s failure. 
But we are going to need more than this.  For my interpretation to hold up in 
opposition to the Marxist one, it will have to be the case that there actually is a 
solution to the problem of civil society.  I have suggested that while unrestricted 
civil society alone and of itself cannot overcome polarization and pauperization, 
with the assistance of the police, corporations, and the state it can.  This is 
something the Marxists would simply deny.  For them, Hegel sees the problem of 
civil society, sees that it cannot be solved by civil society, and the Marxists think that 
in fact it cannot be solved at all—short of eliminating civil society.  Thus, for them, 
Hegel fails and must fail.  For my counter interpretation to hold up, besides seeing 
the problem of civil society and seeing that it cannot be solved by an unrestricted 
civil society itself, Hegel must go on to hold that the problem can be solved at a 
higher level, and for us to take this seriously it must actually be the case that it can 
be solved at that level.  These are the issues that must be addressed in what follows.  
In the first place, then, it is quite clear in Hegel’s texts that he holds that it is in 
fact the state’s task is to prevent the development of poverty.  It needs to “prevent a 
rabble from emerging.”13  It “must make the effort to avoid the damaging 
consequences that can arise from this inequality.”14  Elsewhere, “On the general 
plane it is for the state to prevent universal need by taking appropriate measures … 
“15  Again, “The whole community must also ensure that individual citizens can 
satisfy their needs, i.e., that the commodities are available in adequate quantity and 
at not too high a price … ”16 
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Furthermore, it is Hegel’s view that polarization and pauperization constitute a 
“wrong inflicted on” the poor.17  As Wood puts it, they “are victims not of some 
natural misfortune, but of a social wrong.…  For Hegel, poverty in civil society is not 
an accident, or a misfortune or the result of human error or vice … ”18   
Moreover, for Hegel, this wrong is the result of the normal processes of civil 
society.  This is not the Smithian view that self-seeking, through an invisible hand, 
produces the common good more effectively than if it had been consciously 
sought.19  The invisible hand can produce polarization and pauperization.  Thus, as 
Williams puts it, advocates “of letting ‘the market’ solve the problem of poverty, are 
not only incoherent … but also unethical because there is no market solution to this 
problem.  The market economy, functioning as it is supposed to, generates the 
problem … ”20 
Additionally, what we have here, for Hegel, is a matter of rights, “Civil society 
must protect its members and defend their rights … ”21  Also, “every human being 
has a right to demand a livelihood from society.”22  And, it is the case “that the 
livelihood and welfare of individuals should be secured—i.e. that particular welfare 
should be treated as a right and duly actualized.”23  Even more, this right is 
understood as a positive right, not merely a negative right:24 
 
The essential goal of members of civil society is being provided for.…  The 
universal policing authority can work only to make trade and business bloom on 
the whole, but this does not provide for the particular needs of individual 
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humans, even though it is precisely the particular that is here the goal, and 
individual humans have, as such, the right to demand that they be provided for.25  
 
Justice is a major factor in civil society:  good laws will cause the state to 
flourish.…  But since I am completely involved in particularity, I have a right to 
demand that, within this context, my particular welfare should also be promoted.  
Account should be taken of my welfare, of my particularity, and this is the task of 
the police and the corporation.26  
 
For Hegel, this will require conscious regulation from above.27  The function of 
the police, for Hegel, is to keep in view the general end of civil society, i.e., the 
satisfaction of need, to understand the way in which the powers composing civil 
society act, and to maintain that end through these powers and against them.28  In 
an earlier text, Hegel said, “in this system what rules appears as the unconscious and 
blind entirety of needs and the modes of their satisfaction.  But the universal must 
be able to master this unconscious and blind fate and become a government.”29  
Avineri claims that Hegel is “one of the first to propose something which has … 
many of the characteristics of the modern welfare state.  Time and again, Hegel 
mentions taxation as the great equalizer and instrument for income redistribution … 
”30    
Thus, I think we should understand Hegel as claiming, contra Smith, that there is 
a necessary tendency toward polarization and pauperization in civil society.31  We 
cannot stop this movement toward poverty that is inherent in the system.  We 
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cannot eliminate this development.  Certainly, unrestricted civil society alone 
cannot.  But we can work against it.  We can counteract it.  Indeed, the very concept 
of charity itself implies this.  Charity does not eliminate poverty or the forces that 
produce poverty.  Charity simply eases the poverty.  So, while we do have a 
necessary and un-eliminable tendency toward poverty in civil society, it does not 
follow that Hegel thinks this means the failure of civil society, as the Marxists would 
have it.  He thinks the tendency can and must be counteracted.   
How then can it be counteracted?  One way is through taxation.32  In an earlier 
text, Hegel writes that the “inequality of wealth is accepted if heavy taxes are levied; 
this lessens envy and averts fear of distress and robbery.”33  Moreover, this fits with 
his view, already cited, that it is better if charity is handled by the state:  
 
On the general plane it is for the state to prevent universal need by taking 
appropriate measures … individuals can act in benevolent fashion using the 
machinery provided by the state.  Subjective assistance must be reduced to the 
minimum because it can harm instead of helping.34 
 
This again confirms the notion that unrestricted civil society cannot solve its 
own problems and that we are forced to go beyond unrestricted civil society.  
Individual charity, that is, charity in civil society, is contrary to the principle of civil 
society.  It is harmful.  It undermines the recipients’ feelings of self-sufficiency and 
offends their honor.35  It humiliates them.  
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III.  Corporations  
Humiliation is precisely what corporations are able to avoid.  Within the 
corporation, Hegel says, charity “loses its contingent and unjustly … humiliating 
character … ”36  The corporation transforms external assistance into self-
insurance—something owed one from one’s communal self-help association.  The 
individual contributes to the association, and receives back from it when in need.  
This is the individual’s right.37  It is something that belongs to the individual. 
A corporation, under supervision by the public authority, looks after its own 
interests, admits members in accordance with objective qualifications of skill, 
educates them so as to make them eligible for membership, and protects them 
against particular contingencies such as unemployment.38  The corporation 
preserves the principle of self-sufficiency and honor that is central to civil society.  It 
is the individual’s own doing as a member of a corporation that protects the 
individual from the contingencies of civil society.  Individuals do not merely depend 
upon others; they actively provide for themselves as members of an association.   
The problem of civil society, we have said, is that it produces serious poverty.  
This could be solved by charity, but that is undesirable in that it would be at odds 
with the principle of civil society—self-sufficiency.  Moreover, it is humiliating.39  
The corporation, then, if it does not solve the problem of civil society, at least goes a 
long way toward doing so.40  Hegel says that England has “the most abominable 
poverty and the most extensive rabble, and a great part of this cancer is to be 
blamed on the abolition of the corporations … ”41 
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Membership in a corporation gives one standing and dignity.  One comes “to be 
recognized both in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others.”42  Membership in a 
corporation is evidence of one’s skill, regular income, and means of support.  It is 
evidence that the member is somebody.  One “commands the respect due to one in 
his social position.”43  One is also recognized as an active member of a “whole, 
whose aim is to promote the welfare of society in general.”  The individual’s activity 
is not mere self-seeking.44  Hegel writes:  
 
citizens play only a restricted role in the universal business of the state, yet it is 
essential to provide human beings, as ethical, with a universal activity beyond 
their private ends.  This universal, which the modern state does not always 
provide, is found in the corporation.  We saw earlier … that in fending for 
themselves … the members of civil society also act for others.  But this 
unconscious necessity is not enough; it becomes a known and thoughtful 
ethicality only within the corporation.… [I]ts purpose is … to make an isolated 
business … ethical and to elevate it to a sphere within which it gains strength 
and dignity.45  
 
Groups that have the same vocations, concerns, and interests, for Hegel, should 
be formed into corporations so that they develop their skills and take shape as 
communal associations.  The atomism of modern times, that all fend for themselves, 
abandons the individual to contingency and is harmful: 
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Through this spirit Germany disintegrated into atoms and the empire went into 
decline.… The towns formed alliances, and so the Hanseatic and Swabian 
Leagues came into being, and in this way civil society was formed by means of 
corporations.… This was the high tide of civil life; enjoyment lay in what was 
communal,… Now this spirit is undermined, so that people are ashamed of their 
class, are unwilling to be seen as members of it, and take pride in themselves 
alone.46   
 
In this passage we see especially clearly the importance of corporations for civil 
society.  Civil society does not give rise to corporations; rather corporations gave 
rise to civil society.  Then, civil society brought the decay of corporations.  In Hegel’s 
view, corporations ought to be revived to combat this.     
A corporation, Hegel takes pains to say, is not a guild.47  On the other hand, 
neither is it a modern labor union.  Hegel’s corporations include managers and 
owners, not just the workers, in a given branch of business.  No union would allow 
management to have a say in union matters, but, on the other hand, there certainly 
are cases where unions will struggle to place union representatives on boards of 
directors so that workers have a share in management.  This especially is the goal of 
socialist and social democratic labor unions.48  Moreover, Works Councils, as G.D.H. 
Cole points out in Fabian Socialism, are bodies that would represent “every grade 
and group in the factory as partners in the common adventure of making it a 
success.”  They would not be confined just to trade union members.49   
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In many other ways, labor unions perform the same functions that Hegel wants 
from corporations.  Labor unions work to get their members health, retirement, and 
unemployment benefits, and may assist in providing or supplementing these 
themselves.  They certainly uphold the notion that these are rights owed the worker 
for the worker’s contribution, not charity given to those who failed to be self-
sufficient.  They can also seek to help workers find employment, as well as struggle 
for higher wages and better working conditions.  Unions can also train workers and 
certify their skills.  Labor unions certainly see themselves as providing not merely 
for their own narrow self-interests, or those of their members, but for the common 
good of all workers in society—the universal.  They also enable their members to 
gain a sense of dignity, self-respect, and pride.  They give their members a sense of 
having accomplished things for themselves and for others.  Active union members 
can have a powerful sense of agency—and agency for the universal. 
  At any rate, it is the view of Wood, Hardimon, and Lakeland that the functions of 
Hegel’s corporations and of modern labor unions overlap at least in certain ways.50  
On the other hand, Cullen does not even think that factory workers would be 
allowed into Hegel’s corporations.51  I think, with Prosch, that this is a mistake.52  
Hegel may exclude day laborers from corporations,53 but a factory worker is not 
hired by the day.   
It follows, then, that if we can “prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of 
a rabble,” if we can prevent “a large mass of people [from sinking] below the level of 
a certain standard of living,” and if we can reinvigorate corporations whose 
abolition was responsible in great part for this cancer, then, as we have seen, 
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corporations can go a long way toward handling the problems connected with 
poverty in civil society—thus allowing us to avoid the Marxist conclusion that civil 
society must fail.   
However, for this solution to work, it would first have to handle another 
problem.  In the long passage quoted above, Hegel also says that, besides charity, 
there is another response that we could have to the poor in civil society:  
 
their livelihood might be mediated by work (i.e. by the opportunity to work) 
which would increase the volume of production; but it is precisely in 
overproduction and the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are 
themselves productive that the evil … consists … and this is merely exacerbated 
… 54 
 
The notion that economic crises are crises of overproduction can also be found 
in Marx.55  As Knowles points out, to hold that crises are crises of overproduction is 
a mistake.  It is certainly not the modern Keynsian view.56  Hegel does realize that 
overproduction is overproduction only relative to consumer demand.  But he does 
not seem to realize that the opportunity to work could increase discretionary 
income and thus increase demand.  It would follow, then, that handling the problem 
of poverty would be a bit easier than Hegel thought it would be.  It would not be 
necessary to shy away from job creation in favor of charity.  So corporations, and 
certainly unions, which work to boost, maintain, and stabilize employment and 
wages, would contribute to counteracting poverty, and would not exacerbate it.     
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There is one more thing we must say about corporations.  It is Hegel’s view that 
deputies to the national assembly should be the delegates of corporations.  He 
writes: 
 
the deputies are elected by the various corporations….  It is clearly in the general 
interest that the deputies should include individuals who are thoroughly  
familiar with, and personally involved in, each particular major branch of society 
(e.g. commerce, manufacturing industries, etc.)….  If the deputies are regarded as 
representatives, this term cannot be applied to them in an organic and rational 
sense unless they are representatives not of individuals as a crowd, but of one of 
the essential spheres of society, i.e. of its major interests.57  
 
Such an electoral system may strike us as odd, but, as Wood points out, in the 
constitutional reforms proposed for Prussia by Humboldt and Hardenberg, which 
Hegel supported, political representation was to take place chiefly through 
corporations.58  Moreover, socialists often favor this sort of representation.  After all, 
if we think of corporations as unions, or as like unions in certain respects, then such 
associations could represent the interests of a majority and work to ensure as a 
matter of justice the effective representation of those interests.  Moreover, it is 
Hegel’s view that representation should not be understood merely as the 
representation of one individual by another, but the representation of an interest by 
someone who actually has that interest.59  Despite the presence of management in 
Hegel’s corporations, it is conceivable that the interests of workers, if they have an 
 18 
active say in corporations, could end up being better represented through 
corporations than otherwise.  Moreover, being active in corporations that can send 
deputies to the national assembly could well have the educative effect that Hegel 
expects from such assemblies,60 that is, it could function to educate workers, help 
them see the relation of their particular interests to the universal, and allow them to 
arrive “at true thoughts and insight with regard to the condition and concept of the 
state and its affairs, thereby enabling [them] to form more rational judgements on the 
latter.”61 
At any rate, to conclude our treatment of corporations:  for the conservative, 
poverty in civil society is a mere accident, and perhaps due to character (or the lack 
of it).  For the liberal, poverty is determined primarily by social conditions, not 
character.  Nevertheless, poverty is still an accident that can be remedied, for the 
most part, simply by insuring the smooth functioning of the market.  For Marxists, 
poverty is a necessary tendency of capitalist civil society that cannot be overcome 
short of abolishing civil society.  For Hegel, poverty is a necessary tendency of civil 
society, as it is for Marxists, but it can be counteracted, though not by the market 
itself as for liberals.  It would require additional action by corporations, the police, 
and the state.  
Nor does Hegel hold, I have already argued, the conservative position on charity, 
that it is humiliating and should not be given.  The conservative insists that self-help 
is the only alternative.  But neither does Hegel hold what might be called the liberal 
position on charity, which simply insists on charity and does not pay that much 
attention to the humiliation involved.  Hegel certainly does believe in self-help, but 
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like a socialist, he believes in the collective self-help of small communities (i.e., 
corporations) assisted by the state and by high taxation.  
For the liberal, all individuals have a right to seek their own welfare.  If they fail, 
then the state should help out.  For the conservative, the most the state should do is 
assist failed individuals in helping themselves.  Hegel goes much further than the 
liberal:  I have a right to demand that my welfare be actualized.62  It is the task of the 
police and the corporation to see to this, which is to say that what is required is a 
combination of collective self-help and state assistance.  Again, this is more like the 
socialist than like the liberal or the conservative. 
The Hegelian view that the market produces polarization and pauperization 
when it is functioning normally is not a capitalist view.  For capitalism, polarization 
and pauperization result only from some sort of accident, aberration, or mis-
functioning.  Yet the solution, for Hegel, is not to abolish the market, which Marxists 
think is the only possible solution.  Hegel is holding a middle position, a position that 
is likely to look like that of a left wing nut to the capitalist and like that of a 
hopelessly naïve bourgeois apologist to the Marxist.  For Hegel, you keep the 
market, a market with a necessary tendency to produce polarization and 
pauperization, but you use the police, corporations, and the state to prevent that 
tendency from being actualized.  Avineri complains that Hegel only tries “to mitigate 
some of the harsher aspects of poverty … he is unable to provide a radical 
solution.”63  In other words, Hegel does not propose to eliminate civil society or its 
necessary tendency to produce polarization and pauperization.  Hegel just wants to 
control the market and prevent its tendency from being realized.  But if Hegel’s state 
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can succeed in this, then it means that civil society avoids failure.  It means that it 
does not fail—as the Marxists think it must.  It would mean that Hegel is right and 
the Marxists wrong on civil society. 
The question, then, is whether or not we can actually control the market enough 
to avoid the failure of civil society?  My answer will be that such a strategy is rather 
close to that of social democracy—and it would not be easy to argue that social 
democracy has failed.  Hegel is not a social democrat.  He had never heard of them—
they did not yet exist in his era.  But his views anticipate theirs.        
 
IV.  The Solution        
At this point, one still might want to object to my interpretation of Hegel.  My 
argument is that Hegel does not admit that the problems of civil society have no 
solution at all, but merely that unrestricted civil society is unable to solve its 
problems by itself.  It needs the assistance of the police, corporations, and the state 
for a solution.  But if this is to be accepted as a plausible way to read Hegel, why 
then, it might be argued, doesn’t Hegel go on to give us all the details of this 
solution—and clearly convince us that they can actually solve the problem?  After 
all, in the preceding sections of this paper, at least to a considerable extent, I had to 
pull things out, work them up, and argue for a solution myself.  Hegel did not do that 
for us—at least not clearly and in detail.  The Marxists would say that Hegel did not 
present us with a clear, detailed, and complete solution because there is no solution 
to the problems of civil society—and perhaps Hegel even came to see this himself. 
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But there is another possibility here.  It may be that Hegel thinks he has provided 
us sufficient detail in what he has said about the activities of the police, 
corporations, and the state.  He may not have thought further detail was necessary.  
It could be that, while Hegel did think the problems of civil society were serious, he 
did not think them to be as serious as the Marxists came to think they were—and it 
certainly never occurred to Hegel to think they would require the elimination of civil 
society.  After all, Hegel wrote at an earlier stage of the development of civil society 
and its problems.  And it may well be that he simply thought that the activity of the 
police, the corporations, and the state, as he had sketched them, were sufficient to 
explain how to counteract the negative tendencies of civil society, and to say more 
than he already had would be for the philosopher to get involved in details with 
which philosophy has no expertise.  Hegel, for example, thought that Fichte 
inappropriately concerned himself with such matters in ‘perfecting’ the details of his 
passport regulations.64  The details of the economy should be the concern of civil 
servants, who just deal with them.  What these civil servants have to do with are just 
facts in the world that need to be, and can be, handled—as Hegel’s student, Gans, 
thought.65  In other words, Hegel does not avoid giving us the details of a solution 
because it would be impossible to do so, but because—beyond what he had already 
given us—he thought it would be a practical matter that could effectively be carried 
out by competent civil servants without philosophical micromanagement. 
But if this were to be accepted as an accurate description of Hegel’s attitude, 
then the Marxist is going to hold that Hegel is just hopelessly naïve.  In the real 
world, the problems of civil society cannot be solved short of abolishing civil 
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society—and certainly not by anything so petty as the activity of bureaucrats.  Those 
are just the facts.       
But are they?  Social democracy would not think so.  Social democracy did not 
exist in Hegel’s day, but just as Hegel anticipated the Marxist problem of a 
polarization of classes and the pauperization of the proletariat, so it seems to me he 
anticipated the social democratic, not the Marxist, solution to this problem. 
I am not suggesting that Hegel would be a social democrat if he were alive today.  
I am not suggesting that social democracy grew out of or was inspired by Hegel.  I 
am merely suggesting that there are similarities here and that these similarities can 
throw some light on Hegel’s thought66—and on how we might avoid interpreting it 
such that it ends up with problems it need not have.  I also think—and this will not 
interest all readers—that if we are leftists ourselves, these similarities will help us 
find value in Hegel that other leftists have missed.  
By a social democratic society, I mean a society that is not communist or 
socialist, that is, the means of production are not taken over by the state and 
publicly owned.  Social democracy does not find that to be necessary.67  There may 
be some public ownership, but there are markets, private ownership, buying and 
selling, and thus plenty of room for civil society.  Social democratic societies can 
vary greatly in the proportion of public to private ownership and of regulated to 
unregulated markets.  Sweden, for example, has very few major industries that are 
publicly owned.68   
Social democracies are mixed economies.  They differ from societies that are 
simply capitalist in that the state has a right and a duty to control the economy for 
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the general welfare.  The market does not have a right to do whatever it wants.  The 
task of the state is to prevent poverty, and citizens have a right to this, as they do not 
in capitalist society.  For social democrats and for Marxists, as for Hegel, it is the case 
that the market has a necessary tendency to produce a polarization of classes and 
the pauperization of the proletariat.  That is something capitalists tend not to want 
to admit.  For social democrats and for Hegel, we do not try to eliminate private 
property and the market, as for Marxists.  Instead, we try to counteract their 
negative tendencies and control them.   
For Thomas Meyer, social democracy wants as much of a market as possible, but 
it also wants a just distribution of social goods above and beyond market outcomes.  
It would exempt from the play of market forces health, education, housing, social 
security, the environment, transportation, and urban planning.69  In a social 
democracy, for Meyer, the democratic state is obliged to offer appropriate security 
against all risks arising out of the social structure provided these are of a political 
nature, involve serious limitations on fundamental rights, cannot be reliably 
countered by individual or collective self-help, and can be managed effectively by 
means of political steering measures available to society.70  
Social democrats came to see that in a complex industrial society it is impossible 
to eliminate the market without generating economic disaster, lack of diversity, and 
the absence of freedoms.  Social democracy rejects this aspect of communism.  For 
better or worse, we must accept the market.  But it must be continuously watched 
and adjusted.  It has some positive tendencies.  It encourages entrepreneurial 
innovation, diversities of many sorts, and some freedoms.  But it has some very 
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negative tendencies.  It tends toward a polarization of classes and serious 
inequalities in power.  It produces serious poverty.  And it eliminates freedoms for 
many.  In a social democracy, the forms of governmental control and the extent of 
public ownership of industry will vary—as determined by elected representatives.  
But the point is that the government regulates the economy in the best interest of 
society as a whole rather than for private profit.71  A social democratic society will 
reject the primacy of negative liberties and rank them on a par with positive 
liberties.  It will reject the identification of freedom with property and replace it 
with a concept that balances the liberties of all against property relationships.72  Or, 
much as Hegel put it: 
 
The different interests of producers and consumers may come into conflict, and, 
although the right relation between the two may on the whole arise of its own 
accord, yet the adjustment of the two calls for a regulation standing above both 
sides and put into operation consciously.…  [T]he freedom of trade ought not to 
be of such a kind as to endanger the general weal.73 
 
In another passage, Hegel says that “the health of others is a more important right 
than is the running of a business.”74 
It is also the case that corporations and the police, for Hegel, function much as do 
labor unions and departments of labor and commerce for social democrats.  They 
are expected to work with the state to counteract polarization and pauperization, 
help control the market, and contribute to the welfare of all.  For social democrats, 
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the connection between labor unions and the state would be mediated by a labor 
party, which would seek to get itself elected to the national legislature.  For Hegel 
corporations directly elect deputies to the legislature.  Corporations like labor 
unions are not to be marginalized, suppressed, or eliminated, as tends to be the case 
in capitalist society.  They are encouraged, supported, even institutionalized.  They 
play a positive and central role in governance.  Moreover, labor unions, for social 
democrats, as for Hegel’s corporations, are an attempt to gain a say in management 
for workers.75 
Meyer points out that the United States delivers a volume of social services 
nearly as great as the European states but predominantly through voluntary private 
associations.  He thinks serious objections can be raised to this.  The humiliating 
experience of social insecurity is not eliminated when you are in doubt about the 
type and scope of benefits available to you.  You have no rights here.  Secondly, it 
may undermine your self-esteem and social respectability to depend on the good 
will of private individuals and organizations, which is very different from a legal 
claim of which you as citizen are the co-author.76  Hegel would attempt to 
accomplish the same sort of thing through corporations.77    
 
V.  Alienation  
But before we conclude that Hegel, like social democracy, can avoid the failure of 
civil society expected by the Marxists, there is another issue that must be addressed.  
As Avineri put it (in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper), markets 
cause not only polarization and poverty, but also alienation.78  Such alienation has 
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been especially well described by Marx.  In Chapter 1 of Volume I of Capital, he 
introduces the term ‘fetishism’ to describe what in earlier writings he would have 
called alienation in exchange or alienation in a market economy.79  
Marx tells us that producers put their products on a market; independent, 
impersonal, autonomous market laws set in; and people come to be controlled by 
these market forces independently of their will or consciousness.  Fetishism, Marx 
tells us, means that relations between people come to appear as relations between 
things.80  Market laws are relations between things—relations between products on 
the market.  With highly developed markets, like those found under capitalism, 
one’s whole world comes to appear as a set of abstract, impersonal relations 
between things, not as relations between persons, and certainly not as relations 
under the control of persons.  And these market laws come to dominate the persons.  
This becomes especially obvious by the time you get polarization and pauperization, 
but it is occurring less visibly at all times.   
Fetishism, then, means an absence of freedom brought about not by the evil 
intentions of an individual, group, or class, but by our very own activity, which gets 
out of our control, turns upon us, and dominates us, without our understanding 
what is going on.  Indeed, it all appears normal and natural.  This means that 
markets are not a realm of freedom.  They are highly coercive, though they hide that 
coerciveness.   
Fetishism or alienation occurs because people produce independently 
(separately and privately) and only meet in the market.  And thus they have no 
control over the market laws that set in—basically because they are not organized, 
 27 
they have no cooperative plan, and they have not come to understand what is going 
on.  This suggests (and it was clearly Marx's view in his earlier writings) that 
markets produce fetishism or alienation.  If you have a market, you will have 
alienation.81  
But there is a problem with that view.  At the end of Chapter 1 of Capital, Marx 
gives four examples of societies or situations free of fetishism.  The first three 
(Robinson Crusoe alone on his island, the feudal economy of the middle ages, and 
the patriarchal industry of a peasant family) are all free of fetishism simply because 
there is no exchange (no market—no buying and selling) present.  There would 
therefore be no market laws that could develop and come to dominate.  Relations 
would appear as direct, immediate relations between persons, not as abstract, 
impersonal relations between things.82 
But the fourth example is a problem.  It is clearly that of a socialist society—and 
so we would expect it to be free of fetishism or alienation (as, indeed, Marx claims it 
is).  But at the same time it is also a socialist market economy and so we might 
expect fetishism to be present because there is a market.  
Marx tells us that post-capitalist society could take different forms, which would 
vary with the productive organization of the community and the degree of historical 
development of the producers.  Marx chooses to examine a socialist society where 
there is common ownership of the means of production, where the workers are 
freely associated, and where there is social planning.83  This society is also much like 
the first stage of communist society as described in the “Critique of the Gotha 
Programme.”  Workers earn incomes in proportion to their contribution—that is, in 
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proportion to the amount of time they labor.  Thus there might be something like 
labor certificates (as there are in the “Critique of the Gotha Programme”) that 
workers receive for their labor and exchange for goods on a market.84  It is certainly 
clear in the Communist Manifesto that the first stage of post-capitalist society would 
be a market economy.  There would still be an income tax, and thus there would 
obviously have to be incomes to tax and, presumably, goods to exchange income for.  
There would also still be rents on land, credit (now centralized), and a national 
bank.85 
So, if there is a market, why isn't there fetishism or alienation?  Can a socialist 
market society have market exchange and avoid alienation?  Marx obviously thinks 
so if at the end of Chapter 1 of Capital he lists it as an example of a society free of 
fetishism.  Clearly, Marx has decided that not all forms of market exchange produce 
fetishism.    
What causes fetishism, we have seen, is that people produce independently 
(separately and privately) and only come into social contact when they bring their 
goods to market.  They dump their goods on the market and market laws set in that 
they neither understand nor control.  And these market laws come to dominate 
them.  They can even cause polarization and pauperization. 
But in this socialist market society, there are no isolated, independent producers.  
Producers are associated before bringing their goods to market, even before 
producing them.  They have a common plan and they consciously regulate their 
production and exchange according to this plan.      
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In short, the producers control their exchange instead of being controlled by it.  
There is no unregulated market that they neither understand nor control.  Rather, 
they employ the market as a tool—as a consciously controlled means—to achieve 
commonly decided upon ends.  And thus there is no fetishism or alienation.  In other 
words, to end fetishism, persons relating to persons as persons must be able to 
understand and control the impersonal forces of the market for the benefit of 
persons as a whole.  Instead of being buried in particularity, they must consciously 
act to realize the universal.  
Marx, it is true, is not describing a social democratic society at the end of Chapter 
1 of Capital.  He is describing a socialist society, one with common ownership of the 
means of production.  But such ownership is not what ends alienation or fetishism.  
What does so is the ability of society to understand and control the market, rather 
than be controlled by it.  And to do that, society has to be sufficiently associated to 
have a common plan.  Quite clearly, this too is what a social democratic society seeks 
to do through labor unions, a labor party, and a labor government.86  I have been 
arguing that Hegel’s treatment of a civil society regulated by the police, 
corporations, and the state anticipates this same strategy.  If this is correct, we can 
now see that social democrats, as well as Hegel (or Hegelians on his behalf), could 
refute the Marxist argument that alienation is unavoidable in a market economy—
and could do so with arguments adapted from Marx himself.87 
At any rate, I think enough has been said to free us from the Marxist 
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